CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

GE.95-62379 (E)

(Mr. Schenk, Slovakia)

We do believe that the results of the recently concluded review and extension Conference will have a positive impact on the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Such treaties should be considered as a matter of urgency in practical applications of the outcome of that conference.

The progress that has been achieved during the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was an important prerequisite of the decision of States to extend the NPT. From this point of view the Slovak Republic considers the CTBT to be one of the most important issues the Conference on Disarmament is dealing with. The Slovak Republic is in favour of concluding a treaty which would outlaw all nuclear-weapon tests without exception and forever. We do believe that the remaining political issues will be settled in an expeditious manner in order to narrow the existing gaps and enable the completion of CTBT at the latest in the year 1996.

Besides the CTBT the question of a treaty banning fissile materials production for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is regarded by the Slovak Republic as the most important issue of the Conference on Disarmament. The Slovak Republic supported the idea that the forum to contemplate this issue should be the Conference on Disarmament. In this sense we are in favour of an early start to negotiations based on the so-called simple mandate, to which framework has been constituted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L. By the same token, a future possibility to widen the perception of the matter in order to cover existing stockpiles should not be excluded.

The Slovak Republic welcomed recent declarations of the nuclear Powers to provide the non-nuclear States with guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, together with the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984. We do believe that these intentions shall find their reflection in an appropriate international legal instrument.

The Slovak Republic has also greeted the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and their voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons. We have noticed with satisfaction the contribution of the above-mentioned countries to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of both regional and global security.

The termination of the cold war and the reduction of the nuclear threat made possible an important redistribution of the international public's attention. Besides nuclear arms, the issue of conventional weapons has become a high priority. The excessive accumulation of conventional weapons keeps causing innumerable economic losses and horrendous human suffering. That is why the Slovak Republic is of the opinion that it is of the highest importance to pay due attention to the issue of conventional weapons' transparency and reduction. The Slovak Republic fully supports a further strengthening of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and its amendment comprising

(Mr. Schenk, Slovakia)

to an unprecedented low level. This step is considered to be the best sign of our sincere attempt to contribute effectively to efforts of the international community to achieve universal and complex disarmament. We have also reduced our conventional arms holdings and personnel strength of the armed forces. Within OSCE we made public information on the organizational structure and the size of the Slovak armed forces. We co-sponsored the United Nations resolution on the export of anti-personnel land-mines and immediately, in April 1994, the Slovak Government declared a comprehensive moratorium on the export of all types of land-mines.

Relating to what has so far been said and known, we find it necessary to stress that up till now on every conceivable occasion the Slovak Republic has undoubtedly proved its ability to successfully employ the policy of consensus. It is all the more astonishing that despite the relative simplicity of the problem the member States of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet come to an appropriate solution of Slovak membership in the Conference, which has been supported by a great number of States, including the Czech Republic. At this stage I should like to convey our gratitude to all States that have supported the Slovak request. Your support will never be forgotten. On the other hand, I have to say that we feel embarrassed assuming that the failure to grant membership to the Slovak Republic has not resulted out of a fair attempt to solve the problem but, instead, a political trade-off has prevailed. We believe that the present situation does not fall in full conformity with the spirit of the period and the nature of the Conference. Otherwise, the ethical point of view would have determined a solution of an unambiguous character. Let me point out again that Slovakia has in fact always been an integral part of the Conference through the participation in international activities of the former Czecho-Slovakia. Thus only full-fledged membership in the Conference would create the conditions for the Slovak Republic to actively contribute to the previously experienced and mutually beneficial extent. By the admission of the Slovak Republic, the Conference would gain another valuable member who once belonged to the founders of this distinguished organization.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia for his statement as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to extend my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency in the Conference on Disarmament this month. I am convinced that your able leadership will contribute to making fresh progress in the current session.

This year marks never-be-forgettable 50th year, the year of end of holocaust sweeping the world. The number 50 reminds all of us of war and peace and at the same time, it makes us feel strong the necessity for the security for a nation, the world as well as for ourselves.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

At present, there exists no practical ground for "United Nations Command" in south Korea in that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to sever the hostile relations and our country has become a member in the United Nations.

It was long ago that "United Nations Command" should have been dissolved.

"United Nations Command" in south Korea should immediately be dissolved in accordance with the United Nations resolution and the relations be normalized between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

The significant global disarmament largely depends on the nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons.

My Government and people strongly oppose nuclear weapons as they are surrounded by nuclear Powers and threatened by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea nearly 40 years.

Accordingly, my Government made a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and did its best for its realization.

The historic Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework made last year provided the way to ward off deep-rooted nuclear threat and remove "nuclear suspicion" imposed on us, thereby shaping the prospect for fundamentally resolving nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Agreement reached in Kuala Lumpur on 15 June between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States made it possible to do away with stumbling-block in the way of implementing the Agreed Framework and clearly reconfirmed the responsibility and duty of the parties.

The course of nuclear solution between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States explained that even a very grave issue raised in the hostility could come to political solution through negotiation ahead of confidence-building.

When we look forward to the completion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996, a dangerous tendency is growing among the nuclear power States. This is greatly disappointing the international community.

The recent decision by France of resuming nuclear test is unanimously protested and condemned, which clearly shows how strong is the demand of the international community for the nuclear disarmament.

The arbitrary practice on the part of a great Power like France who denies the majority's demand to stop nuclear tests constitutes great concern and fear by humankind. We cannot but concern through this kind of behaviour that they do, at any time, not hesitate to take any action if they deem it necessary.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

Treaty. The fact is that this decision forms part of the package, comprising three decisions. They are decisions on the extension of the Treaty, on strengthening the review process and on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, respectively. The decision on principles and objectives clearly states, among other things, that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitments to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and that these States pursue with determination systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons: that the CD complete negotiations on a CTBT not later than 1996; that the CD immediately commence and achieve an early conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that these steps could take the form of an internationally and legally binding instrument; and that every effort be made by all States parties to achieve the objective of universality of the membership of the Treaty.

Undoubtedly, these are very important and solemn commitments by the States parties, particularly by the NWSs. It is imperative that the NWSs honour in letter and spirit these commitments, contained in the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

We believe that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are like two sides of the same coin, and are interrelated. We cannot conceive an effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without the effective implementation of concrete measures for nuclear disarmament. In the aftermath of the historic NPT review and extension Conference, it is therefore incumbent on the NWSs to display their greater political will by exercising maximum flexibility both in the context of pursuing the NPT follow-up measures, and in the ongoing negotiations in the CD.

In my statement in the plenary of the CD on 16 February last, I advocated the option of extending the NPT for rolling fixed periods with an automatic renewal mechanism and a strong review procedure. We did so, because we believe that such an option is more supportive of nuclear disarmament, and is more likely to induce greater political will on the part of the NWSs to move forward in multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues. Now that the Treaty has been extended indefinitely, there appears to be even a lesser degree of flexibility, displayed by NWSs in these negotiations. The aforementioned point of view taken by my delegation has now been proven to be correct by the stances espoused by the NWSs in the post-NPT-Conference period. But these nuclear disarmament issues are of immense importance; and the larger interests of the security of the international community are at stake. I should therefore like to urge the NWSs to exercise greater flexibility in these negotiations in the CD in the larger interests of the international community, which are indeed also consistent with their own national interests.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

In the aftermath of the NPT review and extension Conference, there are three crucial tests for the political commitments of the NWSs: they are CTBT, nuclear disarmament and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiating stances taken by the NWSs in the CD on these questions will clearly mirror the depth and seriousness of their commitments on these issues. In the light of the above, the question of nuclear disarmament has now assumed greater importance. It is indeed high time that the CD commence its substantive work on this question. As such, my delegation wishes to call for the speedy establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The very minimum we should like to have on nuclear disarmament is the appointment of a special coordinator. He can thus be entrusted with the task of carrying out consultations on a possible draft mandate, and the necessary preparatory work with a view to establishing the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the 1996 session.

Another question that has acquired a high degree of maturity for serious negotiations is that of security assurances for NNWSs. We urge that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons be re-established as a high priority to carry forward its work.

Resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council and the unilateral declarations made in April by the NWSs on security assurances constitute significant steps in the right direction. It is the first time that all NWSs have collectively accorded security assurances in a United Nations Security Council resolution. Notwithstanding these significant steps, my delegation feels that they have not gone far enough for the following reasons. First, they lack a legally binding character. Resolution 984 could have a positive impact on the crystallization of an international legal norm banning the use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs, were it crafted in such a way as to create a new legal norm in this respect. But resolution 984 is not tailored to meet this requirement. Second, there is not much substance in them, for they are not comprehensive enough in scope to satisfy the concerns of NNWSs. Third, they are not multilaterally negotiated. It is essential that international legal instrument or instruments on security assurances be multilaterally negotiated to ensure that they fully meet the requirements of the NNWSs, and that they are not subject to unilateral denunciation or withdrawal by the NWSs. For these reasons, there still exists an urgent need to conclude a legally binding international instrument on security assurances. Such an instrument should cover both negative and positive assurances. We must stress here, however, that it is negative security assurances that are of primary importance. Any legal instrument - or for that matter any resolution - on security assurances that is weak in negative security aspects like the United Nations Security Council's resolution 984 will be of limited value only.

Our immediate objective in seeking legally binding security assurances is to create a powerful international legal norm banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs. Our ultimate objective in this regard is to

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

put in place eventually an international legal regime of no first use of, and a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons. These measures constitute important steps in the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, which contributes to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war. These measures, including NSAs, will thereby contribute towards the enhancement of international security, while also serving regional and national security interests of all States.

My delegation believes that we can pursue two parallel courses of action in this respect. The first is to pursue negotiations on security assurances in the CD, and the second is to pursue these negotiations in the context of the NPT. We should take up this question at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the next NTP review Conference, and should pursue it further at a conference of States parties to the NPT, to be convened at an appropriate date thereafter for the specific purpose of addressing this question.

I would like to express the deep appreciation of my delegation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, Chairman of the Working Group I, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, Chairman of the Working Group II, Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, and the Friends of the Chair for their untiring efforts to carry forward the CTBT negotiations. Much as we have advanced so far in the CTBT negotiations, the amount of work that lies ahead is substantial; we need to step up the momentum of negotiations considerably, if the target time-frame of 1996 set by the NPT Conference is to be met. There remain several outstanding substantive issues, yet to be resolved, such as the issues of scope, organization, entry into force and some verification provisions.

One of the most crucial outstanding issues before the Ad Hoc Committee is that of the scope of the future treaty. There have been disturbing reports that discussions have been going on in certain quarters to set a certain threshold of nuclear tests to be permitted under the future CTBT. If conduct of such low-threshold nuclear tests were to be allowed under the future treaty, I am afraid that we are going to end up with another partial threshold test-ban Treaty. This is not what we want and what we are striving for. We require a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty, banning all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time, and no less.

Bearing this in mind, we believe that the scope of the future treaty should clearly set out that each State party undertakes not to carry out nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion at any place, to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place. Such a comprehensive scope will provide a basis for achieving an agreed text on this crucial issue.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

Some three months have already elapsed since the CD established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Explosive Devices. We should like to see the immediate commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Group of 21 has provided a most appropriate candidate to chair the Ad Hoc Committee.

Transparency in armaments is a relatively new issue, introduced into the CD just over two years ago. The CD had an Ad Hoc Committee working on this issue in 1993 and 1994. The mandate or the basis for the CD to carry out its work on TIA, emanating from United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36/L, has been exhausted. Resolution 49/75/C, adopted at the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, does not renew this mandate; nor does it bestow any specific task to the CD. Hence, we have a new situation with regard to TIA. We must therefore take a fresh look at this issue.

We have frequently heard some views to the effect that the CD ought to have an ad hoc committee on TIA in order to balance nuclear items on the active agenda of the CD with an item on conventional arms control. We do not share such views for two reasons. First, the Final Document of SSOD-I, which may well be characterized as the most significant document for multilateral disarmament efforts, rightly accorded priority to nuclear issues. Such assignment of priority is still valid today, and should be maintained. Second, TIA covers the whole spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, and is not related exclusively to conventional arms. If the aim is to balance the CD agenda with a new item on conventional weapons, TIA is not the right answer. Finding the right subject in this respect is crucially important. We shall certainly need to reflect more on it.

We are now almost two thirds of the way through this year's current session. We have only one Ad Hoc Committee functioning; there still remain several outstanding issues before us. We admire your great efforts, Mr. President, to resolve these outstanding issues through Presidential open-ended informal consultations, in addition to your regular rounds of consultations. We hope that, with your guidance and diplomatic skills, you will be able to make good progress in your endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement, as well as the kind words addressed to me and his perhaps excessive confidence in the presidency. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion on which I am taking the floor under your presidency I would at the outset like to congratulate you on your assumption of this important office. My delegation is particularly glad to see you in the Chair at this crucial stage in the work of the CD given your country's well-known commitment to the cause of disarmament and to the signal contributions made in this regard by your illustrious predecessors, in particular Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch. We have full confidence that the work of the CD will progress well under your able guidance and I would like to assure you of the fullest support of the Indian delegation in all your endeavours.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

I am taking the floor today to read out the following statement in my capacity as the G-21 Coordinator on NTB:

"The Group of 21 is extremely disappointed and fully shares the concern expressed by the international community at the decision recently taken by a nuclear-weapon State to suspend its moratorium and resume nuclear-weapon testing soon, as well as at the nuclear test recently conducted by another nuclear-weapon State. The States parties of the NPT of G-21 are deeply concerned that such developments run counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference, in particular, the decision on 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' and jeopardizes the credibility of the NTP regime. This is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) and undermines its successful conclusion. The Group of 21 urges that a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States during the CTBT negotiations and until the entry into force of the CTBT.

"Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted raises serious questions about the nuclear-weapon States' real intentions with regard to continued development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern. The Group holds that consistent with the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hod Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low-yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any technique would defeat such purposes. The Group of 21 reiterates that the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. No tests should be allowed for any reason or justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be comprehensive. The nuclear-test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD. In this context, the Group of 21 calls upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to take appropriate measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of the future CTBT.

"The Group of 21 has already expressed its concern in its earlier working papers on the possible use of national technical means (NTMs) for verification purposes. The Group stresses that the NTMs should not be used on a case-by-case and selective basis. The Group also reiterates that the organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data. The judgement by the organization in this regard should be based on data received from the IMS. Moreover, it should be the exclusive responsibility of the organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States parties. The Group is also not convinced of the logic of any

(Mr. Chandra, India)

'voluntary' funding for the international monitoring system (IMS) since the cost of the verification activities of the organization shall be borne by the States parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the organization of the CTBT.

"In view of the above, the Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in 1995".

I request that the above statement of the G-21 may be issued as a working paper of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kinds words addressed to me. The secretariat will circulate the statement by the Group of 21 as a Conference document. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, my delegation is taking the floor for the first time since you took over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. May I, therefore, take this opportunity to warmly welcome you and congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency? My delegation is convinced that under your able stewardship we will be able to achieve success in the important matters that are being dealt with by the Conference.

The purpose of my statement today is to express the position of Sri Lanka on the resumption of nuclear testing. In doing so, I should mention that my delegation subscribes fully to the statement just made by the Ambassador of India on behalf of the Group of 21.

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the continuation of nuclear testing by one nuclear-weapon State and the recent decision made by another to resume testing. These developments are all the more regrettable, taking place so soon after the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension Conference during which the nuclear-weapon States undertook, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing.

Sri Lanka, however, is pleased to note the undertakings given by these nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1996.

While expressing its concern at these unfortunate events, Sri Lanka urges the members of the Conference on Disarmament to conduct their negotiations with renewed vigour to ensure the early conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. In this regard, Sri Lanka wishes to reiterate its strong conviction that the treaty should be comprehensive and without any provision for exceptions; universal; and internationally and effectively verifiable. The CTBT should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments, for all time.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka

I would be grateful if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed to the Chair. The secretariat will distribute the text of the statement of the Government of Sri Lanka. I now call on the representative of Australia, Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE (Australia): I have asked for the floor today, briefly, to dra delegations' attention to a statement made by the Prime Minister of Australia on 23 June relating to French nuclear testing. This statement announced a series of further measures agreed to by the Australian Government on 22 June, further measures, decided against the background of French rejection of the efforts of a delegation from the South Pacific Forum, led by Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Evans, to persuade France not to proceed with the tests.

Our response has been measured. Our response has been strong, unequivocal and concrete, as has been the case for all nuclear testing regardless of the State perpetrating it.

Most importantly for this forum, this response contains a number of specific measures focused upon achieving a universal moratorium on nuclear testing and the earliest possible conclusion of an acceptably formulated comprehensive test-ban treaty by this negotiating forum. We look forward to the further energization of our negotiating effort to achieve this objective and to responsible leadership by the nuclear-weapon States in making this objective, to which all are unequivocally committed, a reality. My delegation will be seeking the distribution of the Prime Minister's statement as an official document of the Conference.

Mr. SANCHEZ APNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you our satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the work of our Conference after your recent arrival in Geneva.

The Argentine Republic regrets that France, a country t which we are bound by major political, economic and cultural ties, has deemed it necessary to resume its nuclear tests. We hope that this will be the last time that nuclear tests are announced to the international community. This concern is based on my country's well-known policy regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, illustrated by the efforts we have made to secure the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty now under negotiation in this Conference.

The Argentine Republic takes note of the fact that the announcement made by President Chirac on 13 June refers to a last series of tests which are limited specifically in time, and views positively the Presidential commitment made on behalf of France to sign the test-ban treaty without reservations in the autumn of 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Yong-Shik Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, once again my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the presidency of this august body. With regard to the statement made earlier by the representative of North Korea, I would like to make a few brief remarks.

First of all, we are disappointed by the remarks of the North Korean representative today. The major part of his remarks, relating to the Korean peninsula, is totally unfounded and groundless, based on unilateral political propaganda. Certain remarks have been repeatedly made in the past also, but to make it clear, I shall make only two points. One is: the North Korean representative said that the Armistice Agreement, concluded in 1953, should be replaced by other peace mechanisms, and the second point I want to raise is the assertion that South Korea has many nuclear weapons. I think nothing could be further from the truth. First of all, it is North Korea which has flagrantly violated the Armistice Agreement since 1953. My Government is of the view that what we should do now is to strengthen the Armistice Agreement and to find out every possible means conducive to creating confidence-building measures. In doing so, my Government recently suggested to give 150 tons of rice free of charge to North Korea. The second point I want to raise is that it was North Korea which was found under great suspicion to make nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA found a big discrepancy between what North Korea reported to IAEA and what the IAEA had expected. It is my delegation's understanding that this Conference is a multilateral forum, designed to make a contribution to the development of multilateral disarmament through productive and forward-looking statements. Based on this understanding, my delegation again urged North Korea not to repeat political propaganda in this Conference, but to show us a positive attitude towards the common effort in the direction of enhancing world peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had occasion several times to explain the reasons behind our decisions relating to nuclear tests, and I would not wish to tire the Conference with a repetition. None the less I think it would be helpful and even necessary to recapitulate a number of points that I have already mentioned. In the past few weeks, I have in particular stressed the fact that it was not one but two decisions that France had adopted. I think everyone is now aware that the decision to conduct a last series of tests, restricted in number, limited in time, is inseparable from the commitment entered into by the President to sign in the autumn of 1996 the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that we are currently negotiating. The fact that some are pretending to overlook this commitment or minimize its scope does not detract from the fact that this commitment has

(Mr. Errera, France)

been entered into and that its scope is considerable, as a number of speakers this morning pointed out, or emphasized. From that standpoint, as I have already indicated, the French decision, far from jeopardizing the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or making it more difficult, more complicated, on the contrary is contributing and will contribute to its successful conclusion. I have also stressed, but I must once again reiterate this, that the decisions we have adopted are fully consistent with international instruments, in particular and including the texts that we signed at the review and extension Conference for the non-proliferation Treaty, notably the declaration on principles and objectives. These texts, if I may once again repeat, are texts that we negotiated with seriousness of purpose, with a completely transparent approach as regards the constraints to which we were subject, and specifically, at no stage did we conceal the fact that the option of a resumption of testing was open. We respect those texts and we will continue to comply with them.

Finally, we are naturally attentive to the concerns that are expressed and we are doing our best to respond to them, to respond to them, as I have also indicated, through a concern for dialogue and a concern for transparency. None the less, it goes without saying that among the statements made on this subject, there are some that are of particular importance, some have a particular flavour. It goes without saying that lessons in virtue carry all the more weight if they are delivered by countries whose conduct in the field of non-proliferation is beyond reproach. Those same statements bring a smile to one's lips when they are selective or when they come from countries whose respect for international commitments in the field of non-proliferation continues to be a genuine source of concern for the international community.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for his statement. I now have no further speakers on the list.

The secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As is customary, the timetable is indicative and may be amended if necessary. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. As you are aware, in keeping with the decision taken by the Conference on 21 August 1990 (CD/1036), there is the possibility of holding a plenary in the morning of Tuesday, 4 July. The secretariat will inform the Conference in due time if this meeting is to take place. The same applies to the informal consultations scheduled for Wednesday, 5 July.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Coordinator of the Group of 21 has asked me to announce that that Group will be meeting in this room immediately after the conclusion of this meeting.

(The President)

I would like to inform you that intensive consultations and fruitful negotiations have been held on the organization of work. The Chair is of the impression that we are very close to reaching agreement. I think that differences remain on only one out of eight items, and they are ancillary rather than substantive. I have convened the group coordinators for a meeting this afternoon after the plenary meeting we will be holding, and I would like to appeal personally to all delegations to give their group coordinators sufficient leeway and sufficient flexibility to allow us to reach an agreement in which all delegations have participated and to which all have made significant and very imaginative contributions.

We have no further business before us, and therefore I shall now suspend this meeting until 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 710th plenary meeting is resumed.

In reopening the meeting I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei Kozyrev. The personal interest which Mr. Kozyrev has displayed for years on the subject of arms control and disarmament, and his thorough knowledge of the matters on our agenda, are well known to us all. Three years ago, in 1992, Mr. Kozyrev addressed this body on the eve of the final phase of the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons. His presence among us today augurs well for the success of our work in the Conference on Disarmament as we approach the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am sure that his statement will contribute to the attainment of that objective.

As my predecessor announced in the Presidential consultations held on 7 June, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held in the afternoon of Thursday, 6 July at 3.30 p.m., to allow the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to deliver his statement to this forum, as well as the speakers on the list.

I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, to take the floor.

Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I welcome you as the representative of the friendly Government of Mexico to this responsible position of President of the Conference. I sincerely wish you success in guiding the work of this important forum. I also thank you for the warm words you addressed to me.

In past years I have indeed had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the diplomatic inner workings of the Conference of Disarmament and the United Nations, and I must say that only a layman would consider this work easy, and the task of leading such a forum something like a sail on the

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peaceful waters of Lake Geneva. In fact we know, like the Secretary-General of the Conference, my fellow-countryman Petrovsky, who also has vast and ever greater experience of multilateral diplomacy, that this is a difficult task which causes sea-sickness in all but very experienced sailors and captains. They do not lose their bearings, and, like you and the Secretary-General, steer the ship in the right direction. Of course the Conference has a considerable amount of confidence in the experience of those gathered here. I could say that it is a kind of council of wise men in the area of disarmament and international security. At the same time, I feel that today there is a need to open up new horizons in moving the international community to a genuinely secure world.

Without exaggeration, two closely related events have marked a historic breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament: the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The partnership between Russia and the United States, to which there is no alternative, and which is gathering strength in a practical, not always easy but nevertheless constant movement forward, has made it possible to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, in other words, to achieve something which even 10 years ago, let alone at the time when the Conference on Disarmament was established, seemed unlikely. Moreover, in only seven or eight years' time, the level of strategic arsenals will stand at only a third of the level possessed by two nuclear States, the United States and Russia, as recently as 1990. I should like to emphasize that the President of Russia and the Government are firmly committed to the goal of ratifying the SALT-2 Treaty. As the President's representative in Parliament on this subject, I can confirm that we will do everything in order to resolve this issue. It goes without saying that we can ratify the Treaty only if there is strict observance of the ABM Treaty based on agreement with the United States concerning the delimitation between tactical and strategic systems. There is understanding of this issue, and work is under way on these problems in accordance with the declaration issued during the visit to Moscow by the President of the United States on 10 May this year.

The indefinite extension of the NPT has provided a firm basis for further efforts by States in the area of nuclear disarmament. There is a possibility of further reductions and ultimately the elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction. Let me repeat what I said recently at the Conference in New York: indefinite extension of the NPT is not a mandate for the five nuclear Powers to continue holding weapons forever, but a stimulus for them to make further active efforts towards disarmament. However, a new threat of unprecedented scope has been emerging with increasing clarity in the recent period, standing in contrast to these efforts by dozens of States arising from their concern about international security. I am speaking about the increase in terrorism on an extensive scale and in extremely cruel forms. The tragic events in Buddenovsk, Oklahoma City and Tokyo have shown that the world must sharply step up its struggle against the demon of terrorism and also erect a reliable barrier to attempts by terrorists to gain access to weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction.

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Closely related to this is the initiative put forward by the President of Russia at the Halifax meeting for the "group of eight" to hold a summit conference in Moscow to discuss the entire range of issues relating to nuclear security. This is another vital issue of international security, a matter of current concern both to State leaders and to ordinary citizens. It is therefore natural that President B.N. Yeltsin's initiative was supported by all our partners in the "group of eight". We intend to embark on consultations regarding the format and the agenda of the meeting without wasting time. The Kremlin leadership has just sent a letter on this subject to the other leaders in the "group of eight".

All of these trends in security and disarmament, both those which are promising and those which are alarming, point to a new agenda for the Conference for Disarmament, the main elements of which, I believe, should be the following.

First, new tasks in the area of nuclear disarmament. The end of the "cold war", and the emergence of a world in which Russia, the United States and other international factors are no longer on opposite sides, have posed the key questions of the role of nuclear weapons on the eve of the twenty-first century in a new light. They need joint thinking both by governments and by legislative bodies in the democratic countries, which have limited budgetary resources, and indeed by taxpayers too. Russia is committed to the ultimate goal of the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We suggest to all our partners that we should move jointly towards this goal, stage by stage, taking into account the specific approaches of each of the nuclear Powers. A good framework for discussing and resolving all these issues could be provided through the conclusion of an agreement on nuclear security and strategic stability, the drafting of which has been proposed by the President of Russia.

The fact that this session marks a milestone should also be displayed through the inclusion of an item on nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the Conference. I would stress - an item on disarmament. We deem it important to appoint a special coordinator entrusted with the task of producing proposals on the contribution which our multilateral forum could make to solving this global issue.

There is another priority for our agenda - the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban-treaty. Russia is doing everything to ensure that such a treaty is drawn up as quickly as possible, especially since the progress of the negotiations is making it possible to reach consensus on the key elements and conclude the treaty next year. The current national moratoriums on nuclear tests must be strictly observed. During the Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty the nuclear Powers agreed that pending the entry into force of the CTB treaty they will display utmost restraint. Consequently we find it hard to agree with those who allege that the continuation or resumption of nuclear tests is not in contradiction with that provision. "Utmost restraint" in this matter should be the same for all.

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And another urgent issue - prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons. The adoption of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD has created the necessary conditions for an immediate start to negotiations on a treaty on this subject. The recently adopted resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council on security guarantees for non-nuclear States, and also the harmonized declarations by nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the NPT, constitute a new and genuine contribution to the strengthening of international security. Russia holds dear the concerns of the non-nuclear States and proposes that we go further and draft a legally binding international instrument on this problem.

Secondly, substantial progress towards the elimination of chemical and biological weapons is vital. As a depositary of the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, Russia has an interest in the creation of effective machinery for ensuring compliance. In this connection, it is important for the Ad Hoc Group of States parties to the Convention to proceed without delay to negotiations on the substance of a draft protocol on verification of the Convention, which could be submitted to the fourth conference for the review of the operation of the Convention in 1996, or later to a special conference of States parties.

The Russian Government is actively preparing to ratify the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We support the efforts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague to prepare for the implementation of the Convention. However, it is essential to take account of Russian interests, particularly in matters relating to the conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities.

Thirdly, the Conference must address in earnest the problem of conventional weapons. The tragic events is Bosnia, and before that in the Persian Gulf and other crisis areas, have underlined the close interrelationship between the process of disarmament and the settlement of local conflicts. It is extremely urgent, in particular, to develop regional and subregional model agreements for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. The Conference cannot stand on the sidelines when it comes to these burning issues. And as a minimum there is a need for strict observance of the regimes introduced by the United Nations Security Council prohibiting supplies of weapons to areas of conflict, and first and foremost to the warring parties in Bosnia. There must be no double standards here. The many victims of local conflicts constitute convincing evidence of the fact that the problem raised by the United Nations Secretary-General of "micro-disarmament", as it has been called, is in fact global in nature. Therefore we propose that the Conference should step up its efforts in this direction, and in particular continue the work carried out in the CD last year to reach agreement on definitions of the concepts of military holdings and procurement through national production. The Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on transparency in armaments should be re-established. Initially perhaps a special coordinator could be appointed to secure agreement on a new mandate for the Committee. This would be better than a continuation of the deadlock affecting the transparency issue.

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Fourthly, the effectiveness of the work of the Conference itself must be increased. The current membership to the Conference does not fully reflect the new realities. Following the end of the "cold war" it is worth reflecting also on issues related to "balance" in the membership of the CD, especially since all the members have what amounts to a veto. In this connection, perhaps as soon as the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament in 1997 we could discuss ways to improve the entire disarmament process. Primarily, we believe, we could consider focusing efforts in this direction in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the single forum for multilateral disarmament and an important link in the emerging system of international security. For these purposes there is a need not just to expand the membership of the CD but also to make its mandate more comprehensive. We also need to think about ways of overcoming unnecessary fragmentation of the disarmament process and concentrating it under the CD. This will also make it possible to outline ways of improving the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Just under 100 years ago, in 1898, Russia was the first to put forward an initiative for limiting and reducing armaments on a global scale and to suggest the convening of an international conference on this issue. The concept of the harmful effects of the arms race on the economic well-being of States and the immorality of using scientific and technological achievements to create ever newer ways of destroying people took shape for the first time on the lips of my fellow-Russians. However, mankind had to go through two world wars and the decades of the cold war before these ideas started to become really integrated in world politics.

I should like to express the hope that this year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the most destructive war mankind has ever seen will constitute a milestone at which the Conference on Disarmament will formulate a new agenda for the establishment of a truly secure world in the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for his important statement, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before I adjourn this meeting I wish to remind you that Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be meeting immediately after this plenary here in this room and that the coordinators of the groups are invited to Presidential consultations.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.